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Abstract
A large theoretical literature assumes that experts differ in terms of preferences
and the distribution of their private signals, but the empirical literature to date
has not separately identified them. This paper proposes a novel way of doing so
by relating the probability a member chooses a particular policy decision to the
prior belief that it is correct. We then apply this methodology to study differences
between internal and external members on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy
Committee. Using a variety of proxies for the prior, we provide evidence that they
differ significantly on both dimensions.
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1 Introduction
Consider an expert who must take one of two decisions whose consequences are uncertain.
Two individual characteristics can potentially guide her decision. First, there are her
preferences over the outcomes associated with each decision. Second, in an idea going
back to Condorcet (1785), she might receive private signals that allow her to update
her beliefs about the probabilities of the different outcomes being realized. Many papers
in the theory literature, especially in the area of committees,1 explicitly model both
dimensions and allow each to influence decision making.
One example of a situation in which these considerations are relevant is monetary
policy, where the exact effect of implementing a given interest rate is, by its nature,
uncertain and decision making power is increasingly being transferred to independent
committees of experts.2 Different monetary policy experts presumably differ both in their
utility from different inflation outcomes—frequently described in terms of “hawks” and
“doves”—as well as in their assessment of the likelihood that inflationary shocks have hit
the economy. While both the preference and signal dimensions are potentially important
in general for explaining expert voting behavior, we are not aware of empirical work that
separately identifies heterogeneity in each dimension separately from data on individual
policy choices. This paper attempts to do so in the context of monetary policy making
at the Bank of England, although, as we explain below, our results could potentially be
extended to others.
One issue that separately controlling for these dimensions can help resolve is how
the policy choices of Bank executives differ from those of outside experts whose only
responsibility is to serve on the committee. Some central banks, like the Federal Reserve
Bank in the US and the Riksbank in Sweden, use committees composed solely of the
former, while the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is made up
of five Bank executives (so-called internal members) and four outside experts (so-called
external members).3 Whether internal or external members differ in terms of preferences
or information clearly has different implications for their inclusion. Several papers in the
literature (Gerlach-Kristen 2003, Bhattacharjee and Holly 2005, Spencer 2006, Besley,
Meads, and Surico 2008, Harris and Spencer 2008) have found internal-external differ-
ences within the MPC, but they generally attribute these differences to externals being
more dovish than internals. Controlling for signal distributions allows us to establish
whether such a difference really exists and to measure its magnitude, as well as to ex-
1See Gerling, Gruner, Kiel, and Schulte (2005) for a survey.
290 percent of 88 central banks surveyed by Pollard (2004) use committees to decide interest rates.
3Some outside experts are appointed directly to executive positions and therefore become internal
members.
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plore informational differences.
After providing some detailed background information on the MPC (section 2), we
explicitly model a monetary policy expert’s interest rate choice as a Bayesian decision
problem (section 3). In the model, an expert must choose one of two interest rates—one
higher than another—and there is a prior probability that an inflationary shock which
requires the higher interest rate has hit the economy. Members can differ both in terms
how much evidence they need that this shock has hit before they choose the high rate,
which one can interpret as capturing preference differences,4 as well as the precision of a
private signal they receive that is correlated with the magnitude of the shock. Whether
or not such a signal literally represents more information is a matter we do not seek to
resolve; the point is to model any systematic differences in how members arrive at their
posterior beliefs given the prior.
We then show that differences in preferences and signal distributions are separately
identifiable using information on the prior. The logic is as follows: if a member requires
more evidence for the high shock to vote high (i.e. he is more dovish than another), then
he will tend to vote for lower rates no matter what the value of the prior. In contrast,
if a member has a more precise private signals than another, then he is less influenced
by the prior and will tend to vote for the high rate more often when the prior favors the
low state and for the low rate more often when the prior favors the high state; informally
speaking, he is less likely to “follow the crowd”.
In order to take our model to the data, we need to construct a convincing proxy of the
prior in each period (section 4). We combine three sources of data: a monthly Reuters
survey of financial economists working in London; a monthly meeting of an informal MPC
assembled from monetary policy experts by the Times of London newspaper; and options
prices. We then use common factor analysis to extract the principal component driving
the variation in all three sources and use it as our measure of the public prior.
Our empirical analysis begins by showing that the frequency with which internal
members vote high relative to externals varies significantly for different values of the prior.
To uncover why this is the case, we structurally estimate the parameters in internal and
external members’ decision rules generated by our model. We find that (1) significant
differences exist in terms of preference conflict and signal distributions and that (2)
allowing for variation in signal distributions significantly better fits the voting data. This
means that the hawk-dove distinction between internals and externals discussed in the
4In fact we assume, as does the Bank of England, that all members have the same objective function:
to hit the inflation target. We present an explicit model of the macroeconomy in order to show how
differences in the evidence threshold nevertheless arise from different (fixed) beliefs about the structural
parameters of the economy. We will term this a member’s “philosophy” rather than preferences, but for
informal purposes one can think of them as equivalent.
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literature is robust to controlling for signal heterogeneity, although we argue that we
more accurately measure the magnitude of the difference. The more novel result is that
fundamental differences exist in how members form their posterior beliefs. Appropriately
modelling and controlling for differences in the distributions of private signals is important
to more accurately fit the data than is possible by considering preference differences alone.
These results open up two potentially fruitful areas for research. First, our results
show that the behavior of MPC members is richer than previously understood. While
much of the discussion surrounding monetary policy makers appeals to the hawk-dove
dichotomy, our paper shows there is a wholly different dimension that is hardly ever
discussed and is nevertheless important for explaining policy making. Looking deeper
into exactly why external members form (or behave as if they form) posterior beliefs that
are less influenced by the public’s beliefs than internals is the next logical step in terms of
the monetary literature. In terms of the broader economics literature, our approach—with
only slight modifications—could be used to estimate preferences and signal distributions
in any context where one has individual decision data along with a credible measure of
public beliefs about what the right decision is. Examples might include stock analysts’
decisions to downgrade investment recommendations following the arrival of a common
negative asset shock and competition commissions’ decisions about whether to punish
anti-competitive behavior following an investigation. Although these broader issues are
beyond the scope of this paper, we hope it can stimulate thinking about them.
2 The Monetary Policy Committee
Until 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the government minister in charge of the UK
Treasury) had sole responsibility for setting interest rates in the UK. Immediately after
the UK general election in 1997, the new Labour government established an independent
committee of experts, the MPC, for setting interest rates. Its remit, as defined in the
Bank of England Act (1998) is to “maintain price stability, and subject to that, to support
the economic policy of Her Majesty’s government, including its objectives for growth and
employment.” In practice, the committee seeks to achieve a target inflation rate of 2%,
based on the Consumer Price Index.5 If inflation is greater than 3% or less than 1%, the
Governor of the Bank of England must write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining
why. The inflation target is symmetric; missing the target in either direction is treated
with equal concern.
The MPC first convened on 6 June 1997, and has met every month since. Throughout
5This target changed from the RPIX to the CPI measure of inflation in January 2004, with a reduction
in the inflation target from 2.5% to 2%.
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the paper we analyze the MPC voting records between June 1997 and March 2009 which
is when the main focus of the decision (temporarily) shifted to asset purchase decisions
related to quantitative easing.6 The voting records indicate both the proposed interest
rate decision (such as +50 basis points), as well as the alternative preference for those
who do back the proposal (such as +25bps).7
The MPC has nine members; five of these are internal members serving as executives
of the Bank of England: the Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist, and
the Executive Director for Markets. The Chancellor also appoints four external members
(subject to approval from the Treasury Select Committee) from outside the Bank. There
are no restrictions on who can serve as an external member; external members have
come from many different backgrounds.8 Bar the governors, all members serve three year
terms; the governors serve five year terms. When members’ terms end, they can either
be replaced or re-appointed. Table 1 lists the members that served on the MPC during
our sample and whether they are internal or external. Our sample contains a total of 13
internal and 14 external members.
Table 1: MPC Members
Internal Member Tenure External Member Tenure
Howard Davies 06/97 - 07/97 Willem Buiter 06/97 - 05/00
Edward George 06/97 - 06/03 Charles Goodhart 06/97 - 05/00
Mervyn King 06/97 - 03/09 DeAnne Julius 11/97 - 05/01
Ian Plenderleith 06/97 - 05/02 Alan Budd 12/97 - 05/99
David Clementi 11/97 - 08/02 Sushil Wadhwani 06/99 - 05/02
John Vickers 06/98 - 11/00 Christopher Allsopp 06/00 - 05/03
Charles Bean 10/00 - 03/09 Stephen Nickell 06/00 - 05/06
Paul Tucker 06/02 - 03/09 Kate Barker 06/01 - 03/09
Andrew Large 11/02 - 01/06 Marian Bell 06/02 - 06/05
Rachel Lomax 07/03 - 06/08 Richard Lambert 06/03 - 03/06
John Gieve 01/06 - 03/09 David Walton 07/05 - 06/06
Spencer Dale 07/08 - 03/09 Tim Besley 06/06 - 03/09
Paul Fisher 03/09 - 03/09 David Blanchflower 06/06 - 03/09
Andrew Sentance 10/06 - 03/09
6These data are available from the Bank of England (2010a). We use each regular MPC meetings in
this period but we drop from the dataset the (unanimous) emergency meeting held after 9/11.
7Before June 1998 there is information about whether members preferred higher or lower interest
rates compared with the decision, but not about their actual preferred rate. In these cases, we treat a
member’s vote as either 25 basis points higher or lower than the decision, in the direction of disagreement.
Given how we use the voting data, discussed below, this assumption has no implications for our analysis.
8Of course there are restrictions, to avoid conflicts of interest, on what the members can do while
serving on the committee.
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Each member is independent in the sense that they do not represent any interest
group or faction. The Bank encourages members to simply determine the rate of interest
that they feel is most likely to achieve the inflation target,9 and majority vote determines
the outcome. As such, the observed votes should reflect members’ genuine policy prefer-
ences. Consistent with its one-person one-vote philosophy, the MPC displays substantial
dissent. 64% of the 142 meetings in the sample have at least one deviation from the
committee majority. Figure 1 shows the level of interest rates that the MPC has imple-
mented, the votes of each member around this, and highlights the periods of interest rate
loosening.10 Figure 2 shows how many votes were cast in each meeting in opposition to
the final decision. Within the set of non-unanimous meetings, 5-4 and 6-3 decisions are
not uncommon.
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Figure 1: Votes and Decisions
The MPC meets on the first Wednesday and Thursday of each month. In the month
between meetings, members receive numerous briefings from Bank staff and regular up-
dates of economic indicators. On the Friday before MPC meetings, members gather for a
meeting in which they are given the latest analysis of economic and business trends. Then
9According to the Bank of England (2010b)
Each member of the MPC has expertise in the field of economics and monetary policy.
Members are not chosen to represent individual groups or areas. They are independent.
Each member of the Committee has a vote to set interest rates at the level they believe is
consistent with meeting the inflation target. The MPC’s decision is made on the basis of
one-person, one vote. It is not based on a consensus of opinion. It reflects the votes of each
individual member of the Committee.
10The loosening cycle is defined as the period from the first cut in interest rates until the next increase
in interest rate.
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Figure 2: Deviations
on Wednesday members discuss their views on several issues. The discussion continues
on Thursday morning, when each member is given some time to summarize his or her
views to the rest of the MPC and to suggest what vote they favor (although as Lambert
(2006) notes they can, if they wish, wait to hear the others views before committing to a
vote). This process begins with the Deputy Governor for monetary policy and concludes
with the Governor, but the order for the others is not fixed. To formally conclude the
meeting, the Governor proposes an interest rate decision that he believes will command a
majority. Each member then chooses whether to agree with the Governor’s proposal, or
dissent and state an alternative interest rate. The MPC decision is announced at noon,
and two weeks after each meeting, attributed members’ votes are published as part of
otherwise unattributed minutes.
3 Model
We now lay out a parsimonious model that captures the basic elements of MPC members’
decision making that, by highlighting the drivers of their behavior, will serve as the basis
of our empirical analysis. We assume that the MPC, in each period t, must decide
vt ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 represents the lower of two possible rate changes and 1 the higher.11
The restriction that a vote must take one of two values is not as restrictive as it might
first appear since there are three unique votes in only 7 of the 142 meetings in our sample
11We do not attempt to model the two rates over which voting occurs; Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010)
has recently studied this issue.
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and in no meeting are there four or more unique votes.
We model inflation in period t as pit ∼ F [ pit | vt ] where E[ pit ] = θ + ωt − vt and
V (pit) < ∞.12 The objective function of MPC members is to pick the interest rate that
they view as consistent with hitting an inflation target pi∗; specifically, in period t member
i chooses a vote to solve
max
vit∈{0,1}
E
[− (pit − pi∗)2 ] (1)
where member i treats inflation as coming from the distribution pit ∼ F [ pit | vit ].
The first driver of inflation is ωt ∈ {0, 1}. This represents economic conditions relevant
to inflation at time t such as the magnitude of a demand shock or the output gap of the
economy. We call ωt = 1 the “high inflation state” and ωt = 0 the “low inflation state”.
These states capture that in some times the economy faces more inflationary pressures
than others. Member i has belief ŵit on the expected value of ωt.
The second driver of inflation is θ ∈ [θ, θ]. This represents structural sources of
inflation such as the natural rate of interest or monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Member i has belief θ̂i on θ. We do not allow this belief to vary with time; one can imagine
that information about θ does not arrive every period and so members’ beliefs on it evolve
slowly, if at all. It therefore represents a fixed source of disagreement among members
and can capture the hawk-dove distinction frequently made in the monetary literature;
ceteris paribus, a member with a higher θ̂i believes future inflation to be more likely than
one for whom it is lower. We wish to remain agnostic about the specific dimension of
disagreement that θ̂i represents and therefore refer to it as a members’ philosophy.
Given the objective function, the goal is to choose the vote that will make expected
inflation closest to the target pi∗. This implies choosing vit = 1 if and only if 13
ω̂it ≥ 1−
(
θ̂i − pi∗ + 0.5
)
≡ 1− θi. (2)
In words, member i votes for the high rate only when his belief that the economy
is in the high inflation state is sufficiently large. Rather than consider the quantity θ̂i,
we consider its linear transformation θi. Notice that heterogeneity in θi would also arise
12We think of pit as the distribution of inflation outcomes at the two year horizon since that is the
horizon at which committee members are told to direct monetary policy.
13
−E
[
(pit − pi∗)2
]
= −E[pi2t ]+ 2pi∗E[pit ]− (pi∗)2 = −V [pit]− (E[pit ]− pi∗)2 .
So vit = 1 is chosen if and only if
−
(
θ̂i − 1 + ω̂it − pi∗
)2
> −
(
θ̂i + ω̂it − pi∗
)2
7
if inflation targets are person-specific, which would be the case if members literally had
different preferences. Since every member used in our sample sometimes votes for high
and sometimes for low rates, we impose the restriction θi ∈ (0, 1). Every member votes
for the high rate when they are certain that the high state has hit and for the low rate
when they are certain the low state has hit; however, they differ in how high the belief ω̂it
must be in order to vote high. This is how philosophical differences manifest themselves
in our model.
The model is a reduced form version of at least two commonly-used models. First,
one can show that our decision rule is equivalent to one that arises in a standard New
Keynesian model of the macroeconomy (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler 1999, Gal´ı 2008).
Appendix A.3 presents this model and shows its equivalence to the above in terms of
policy choices. Second, one can view θi as a preference parameter over type I and type II
errors along the lines of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and again derive a behavioral
equivalence to the above model.
While no information arrives about θ that allows members to update their beliefs θ̂i,
we allow them to form their beliefs on the inflationary state according to Bayes’ Rule
in the standard way for decision problems under uncertainty. They all begin with a
prior belief qt = Pr [ωt = 1 ] that the economy is in the high inflation state that can be
interpreted as conventional wisdom about inflationary pressures. In addition members
receive private signals sit ∼ N(ωt, σ2i ) that allow them to update their prior to arrive at
belief ω̂(sit). Heterogeneity in σi represents heterogeneity in the distribution of private
signals. In principle, one could allow σi to evolve with time; we will discuss the restriction
of time-invariance in section 6 below.
As a behavioral matter, a member with a lower σi will put more weight on his signal
and less weight on the prior qt. To see this in a simple way, note that a member’s posterior
belief has the following relationship with his signal:
ln
(
ω̂(sit)
1− ω̂(sit)
)
= ln
(
qt
1− qt
)
+ ln
(
f1
f0
)
where f1 ∼ (1, σ2i ) is the distribution of sit conditional on ωt = 1 and f0 ∼ (0, σ2i ) is the
distribution of sit conditional on ωt = 0. Further simplifying, using the assumption that
sit is normally-distributed, yields
ln
(
ω̂(sit)
1− ω̂(sit)
)
= ln
(
qt
1− qt
)
+
2sit − 1
2σ2i
. (3)
In other words, if a member receives uninformative signals (σi = ∞), his belief will
be determined only by the prior (ω̂(sit) = qt for all sit). As the signal becomes more
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informative (σi declines), he puts more weight on the signal relative to the public prior.
The committee voting literature take seriously the idea that a member with a lower
σi has more private information. While this may be the case on the MPC, other inter-
pretations are possible. For example, a member with a lower σi may put more weight
on their own forecast relative to standard forecasts.14 We do not wish to take a stand
on the underlying source of this information difference, but rather to simply show that it
has contributed to voting differences.
We assume that member i votes high whenever ω̂it(sit) ≥ 1−θi; that is, he maximizes
his expected utility conditional on sit and qt. In other words, we model members’ votes
as individual decision problems rather than as equilibrium outcomes of a strategic voting
game. The primary strategic concern in voting games is that members must use the
information conveyed in the configurations of other members’ votes in which they are
pivotal to the decision to update their beliefs. These considerations are most relevant
under super-majority rules; since the MPC operates under majority rule we do not view
the additional complication of equilibrium play as having enough empirical relevance to
justify its inclusion.15
We make no attempt to model the effect of pre-vote communication on beliefs ω̂it.
The theory literature in this area is itself quite nascent, so the paper leaves the issue
aside. One might imagine that the ability to reveal private information during discussion
should reduce heterogeneity in posterior beliefs, not increase them. If this is the case,
not accounting for communication should bias us against finding differences in private
information, not towards finding such differences.
Our first result pins down member i’s period t decision rule as a function of his signal.
Proposition 1
v(sit) =
1 if sit ≥ s∗it0 if sit < s∗it
where
s∗it =
1
2
− σ2i ln
(
θi
1− θi
qt
1− qt
)
. (4)
Because the normal distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, higher
realizations of sit provide more evidence of inflation, so members adopt a cutoff rule (with
14This interpretation is preferred by Blinder (2007), who points out that members do not differ in
the amount of information they have, but in their views about the implications of the same data for
inflationary pressures.
15A recent experiment reported in Goeree and Yariv (2010) shows that under majority rule members
vote with the signal in over 90% of cases, a percentage that drops markedly as decision rules become
biased against one of the voting outcomes.
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s∗it as the cutoff).
The principle value of the model is that it allows one to separately identify the effect
of differences in philosophy and differences in private information on observed voting
behavior, which we now discuss. Suppose that θi increases so that member i requires less
evidence of the inflationary shock to vote for the high rate. The associated change in s∗it
is
∂s∗it
∂θi
= − σ
2
i
θi(1− θi) < 0 (5)
which immediately implies that the probability a member votes more often is decreasing
for all values of the prior.
Now suppose that σ2i increases. The associated change in s
∗
it is
∂s∗it
∂σ2i
= − ln
(
θi
1− θi
qt
1− qt
)
S 0 ⇐⇒ qt R 1− θi. (6)
When qt favors the high state, an increase in σ
2
i reduces the threshold that the signal
must reach for the member to vote high, increasing the range of values of the signal for
which the member votes high. Exactly the opposite logic works when qt is low. Intuitively
speaking, when σ2i increases, the member becomes more likely to “follow the crowd”, and
moves the threshold towards accepting whichever rate the prior does.
Although the derivative in (6) does not immediately imply anything about changes
in the probability of voting high since the distribution of signals also depends on σi, it
still provides the intuition for the following result.
Proposition 2 When θi increases, the probability that member i chooses vit = 1 increases
for all qt; when σ
2
i increases, the probability that member i chooses vit = 1 increases if
and only if qt ≥ q∗ ∈ (0, 1).
In short, if two members have the same distribution of private signals but differ in terms
of philosophy, then the more hawkish member votes for systematically higher rates for
all values of the prior. In contrast, if two members have the same philosophy but differ
in the signal distribution, the member with a lower σ will vote for systematically higher
(lower) rates than the member with less expertise when prior beliefs are low (high).
Figure 3 gives a graphical interpretation of proposition 2. For all combinations of θi
and σi, increases in the prior qt increase the probability of voting high. An increase in
θi induces a shift in the predicted probability, while an increase in σi induces a rotation.
The remainder of the paper will exploit the intuition behind proposition 2 to examine
differences in private information between internal and externals.
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Figure 3: Distinguishing Information and Preferences
4 Constructing Public Beliefs
The main empirical challenge we confront is that we do not observe qt, but there are
several observable sources of data on public beliefs that provide reasonable proxies for qt.
The three different measures that we use are:
1. A survey of market economists conducted by Reuters (Reuters q ≡ q̂Rt ).
2. The voting record of the Times MPC (Times q ≡ q̂Tt ).16
3. Implied probabilities from short sterling option prices (Market q ≡ q̂Mt ).
This section describes the construction of each, their strengths and weakness, and how
they can be combined to derive a single common factor that one can view as the prior.
Of course, in order to construct an empirical measure of qt, one needs to know the
set of rates over which voting occurs in period t. More generally, in order to test our
model, we need an empirical counterpart of vit, which we denote by v̂it. As discussed
above, we model the choice facing MPC members as being over two alternative interest
rates (one higher than the other) while members have, since the beginning of the MPC,
voted for nine unique interest rate changes.17 In periods with two unique votes by the
MPC members (64% of the meetings), we set v̂it = 1 if and only if member i voted for
16We also got access to a similar independent committee organized by the Institute of Economic Affairs
(IEA). While this has the advantage of being in existence since before to the start of the MPC, it only
meets every 3 months, it has a rotating attendance of members, and on many occasion only made an
assessment of the current stance of policy rather than formally voting on an ideal policy choice.
17These are -150bps, -100bps, -75bps, -50bps, -40bps, -25bps, no change, +25bps and +50bps.
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the higher of the two rates under consideration in period t. This approach means that a
vote of +25bps can be mapped to v̂it = 1 (if the alternative was no change) or v̂it = 0 (if
the alternative was +50bps). The problem comes in periods with unanimous votes since
it is not clear whether the alternative under consideration is higher or lower. To resolve
this difficulty, we make use of the Reuters data, as explained below.
4.1 Reuters survey data
In the days leading up to the MPC meeting, Reuters surveys around 30-50 market
economists from financial institutions in London and asks them to predict the outcome
of MPC voting by writing a probability distribution over possible interest rate choices.18
Because of the fairly large cross-sectional sample size and the prominence of the partici-
pating institutions, the average beliefs in the survey data can be taken as a good measure
of conventional wisdom.
In periods with two unique votes by the MPC members we set q̂Rt equal to the average
probability placed on the higher observed rate over the total average probability placed
on both observed rates. In periods with one observed vote, we use the survey to identify
the two rates on which the market places the highest average probability and then set
v̂it = 1 if an only if i votes for the higher of these two rates.
19 We then set q̂Rt equal
to the average probability placed on the higher rate over the total average probability
placed on both rates. The Reuters data is the only one of our measures to provide a full
probability mass function over voting alternatives, so it is the natural choice for selecting
the two most likely outcomes in periods with unanimous voting.
Table 2 illustrates a hypothetical example of the survey and how we use it. The two
outcomes with the highest average probability are a rise of 50 basis points and a rise
of 25 basis points. So, if we observed a unanimous vote of +25, our proxy measure for
the prior would be q̂Rt =
23.75
23.75+71.25
= 0.25 and we would set v̂it = 0 for all members.
In fact the survey data has somewhat different formats for different sub-samples within
our data and in some cases respondents were not able to write their beliefs over a full
probability distribution. In these cases we follow a slightly different methodology, but
the construction is similar. Appendix B.1 contains the full details of the construction in
18As Reuters did not have the survey results stored in their database, they were unable (or unwilling)
to provide the data for us. Instead, we have been able to collate copies of the survey results for most
periods in the sample; the two exceptions are February 2000 and March 2000. In addition, we are unable
to use the data for periods April 2000, August 2008, and November 2008 (details of why are in the
appendix). This leaves 137 out of the 142 months in our sample in which we can construct q̂Rt from this
survey.
19We confirm that the unanimous decision reached by the MPC is one of the interest rates on which
the market puts highest probability, which is itself an important test of the quality of the Reuters survey.
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all periods, including how we treated anomalies in the data.
Table 2: Example of Survey Data
+50bps +25bps 0 -25bps -50bps
UBS 15% 80% 5%
Goldman Sachs 20% 75% 5%
JP Morgan 45% 45% 10%
AIB 15% 85%
Average 23.75% 71.25% 5%
Of course, q̂Rt is not a perfect measure of the unobservable qt. For example, the
data on which respondents from their beliefs is a subset of that available to the MPC; the
committee is regularly given advance access to data that will only be released subsequently
to the wider public, and the information about the MPC’s own quarterly forecast is not
known by the market respondents until the middle of the month in which it is published
(about 2 weeks after the decision). Perhaps the most serious potential problem is that
q̂Rt predicts the outcome of MPC voting, not the probability of the realization of the
underlying state variable. We take this problem very seriously and will return to it below
(see in particular sections 4.4 and 6.2).
4.2 Times MPC data
The second data source on which we draw is voting data from the Times MPC. This MPC
is a committee of experts—many of whom are former or future MPC members—that votes
monthly on interest rates as part of a feature for the Times of London newspaper. Im-
portantly, they are giving opinions on what they think interest rates should be, not on
what they think the committee will choose. We construct q̂Tt as the fraction of Times
MPC votes for the higher of the two rates under consideration (identified either directly
or indirectly via the Reuters data). Unfortunately, the Times MPC votes are a discrete
measure of views and may not capture precise movements in probabilities well. Addi-
tionally, the Times MPC only began meeting November 2002, so using it means we lose
65 out of 142 meetings (561 out of 1,246 observations).
4.3 Option price data
The third data source on which we draw comes from the cross-section of prices for short
sterling futures options the first day (Wednesday) of the MPC meeting.20 Short sterling
20Full details about these data, as well as the data itself, are provided by the Bank of England (see
Bank of England (2011a), Bank of England (2011b) and Lynch and Panigirtzoglou (2008)); here we
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futures contracts are standardized futures contracts which settle on the 3 month London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) on the contract delivery date. Short sterling futures
options are a European option (it only settles on the delivery date and not before) on the
short sterling futures contract but since the futures contract settles on 3 month LIBOR,
the option is effectively an option on 3 month LIBOR. The Bank of England computes the
expected value of 3 month LIBOR consistent with a risk neutral trader being willing to
hold the option at each observed price; this yields a distribution over risk-neutral traders’
beliefs on 3 month LIBOR. The Bank then publishes the 0.05, 0.15, . . . , 0.95 percentiles of
this CDF. Figure 4 displays the spot 3 month LIBOR rate as well as various percentiles
of this CDF. We subtract the actual value of LIBOR on the Wednesday of the MPC
meeting (before the decision is made on the Thursday) to express the CDF in terms of
traders’ beliefs on changes in 3 month LIBOR. We denote this transformed CDF as F ,
and an individual belief about a change x.
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Figure 4: Short-Sterling Implied PDF and 3 Month LIBOR
Since base rate changes are made in discrete 25 point movements while traders’ beliefs
are continuous, we consider beliefs that lie within 12.5 basis points on either side of the
corresponding change to be beliefs associated with that change being more likely. So, for
example, our ideal proxy measure for qt in a period in which no change and a 25 point
rise are on the agenda would be
Pr [ 12.5 ≤ x ≤ 37.5 ]
Pr [−12.5 ≤ x ≤ 37.5 ] =
F (37.5)− F (12.5)
F (37.5)− F (−12.5) .
simply outline the assumptions underlying these data, why they provide useful information for our needs
and the weaknesses of the data for our use.
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Unfortunately we only observe certain percentiles of F . To correct for this, we linearly
interpolate between the two percentiles in which a rate change falls. So, for example,
suppose that we observe that F (10) = 0.1 and F (20) = 0.3; then we would construct
F (12.5) = 0.15. Using this method we are able to build q̂Mt for all but four time periods,
meaning that we observe the markets data for 138 meetings out of 142 possible meetings
in our sample.21
q̂Mt undoubtedly has several problems, and is perhaps the weakest proxy we construct.
First, the sterling options that go into the constructed probabilities are based on LIBOR
rather than the interest rate that MPC members choose (Bank of England base rate).
Second, it is based on beliefs about the 3-month interest rate and as such reflects expected
changes over the next three meetings not simply the one immediately following. Third,
the beliefs are associated with risk-neutral traders; to the extent that actual traders are
risk averse the beliefs backed out from option price data will be biased downward (yields
will be biased upward) by the presence of a risk-premium in the observed market data.
Finally, as with the Reuters data, q̂Mt captures predictions about LIBOR, not underlying
inflation states. Despite these problems it is a useful measure because it aggregates the
opinions of a large number of agents (all traders in the sterling options market) and,
unlike with the Reuters and Times MPC data, these opinions are backed by real money
and so potentially less subjective and manipulable.
4.4 Common Factors
So far this section has presented three alternative proxies for qt. While each has specific
weaknesses, we claim that beliefs about the underlying inflationary state should drive at
least some of the variation in all three. To examine how much of the variation it drives,
whether there are any other sources of variation, and to aggregate the three measures
into a common measure, we adopt a factor analysis approach. Specifically, we adopt the
model specification
Φ−1
(
q̂R
)
=αR + ηR,1f1 + ηR,2f2 + ηR,3f3 + R
Φ−1
(
q̂M
)
=αM + ηM,1f1 + ηM,2f2 + ηM,3f3 + M
Φ−1
(
q̂T
)
=αT + ηT,1f1 + ηT,2f2 + ηT,3f3 + T
where Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative density function; f1 is the
principal common factor; f2 and f3 are other common factors; and  are normally dis-
21The missing periods are February and March 2000, August 2008, and November 2008. These data
are missing due to thin or illiquid short-sterling options markets which mean that no options pdf data
is available on the days in the run up to MPC meeting.
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tributed error terms. It is necessary to transform the raw measures because we need the
left hand side variables to have the same range as the right hand side (−∞ to ∞).22 We
believe that f1 is likely to capture the underlying public prior, or, in the language of our
model, qt. We will return to this assumption below; for now we stay agnostic and simply
perform the factor analysis as a statistical procedure.
Factor analysis allows us to estimate f1 as well as to determine whether f2 and f3
also have explanatory power and, if so, in which of the variables. Applying the Kaiser
criterion (Kaiser 1960), which suggests keeping only those factors with eigenvalues greater
than 1, we find a single factor that captures co-movement in the variables; the associated
eigenvalue is 1.5. The eigenvalue associated with the second common factor is essentially
0, meaning it contributes nothing to the common movement. This result has important
implications for understanding the effect on q̂M and q̂R of traders and Reuters respondents
predicting the decision and not the inflation shock. First, since f1 is recovered from q̂
T
as well as q̂M and q̂R, it is not capturing any force associated with predicting decisions.
So the fact that f2 explains no additional variation in q̂
M and q̂R means that the way in
which individuals map qt into a decision prediction does not vary systematically over our
sample period. At the same time, even if this mapping is non-linear and complex, our
factor analysis approach should strip out the underlying variable driving the volatility
in the observed q̂M and q̂R, which we argue is precisely qt. We return to these issues in
section .
Meanwhile, the percentage of the variance that the common factor explains in q̂M ,
q̂T , and q̂R is, respectively, 26, 50, and 74. This is consistent with the common factor
reflecting qt. As explained above, the market’s beliefs about three-month LIBOR are
only indirectly related to their beliefs about one-month Bank Rate; the Times data is
a discrete measure that may not move much with qt in some cases; but the Reuters
respondents directly state continuous beliefs about the next decision.
We use the estimated common factor f̂1 to construct a measure of qt by using the
reverse transformation q̂RMT = Φ(f̂1). Since q̂
RMT reflects the common component in the
three measures, we view it as a better measure of public beliefs than any raw data series
on its own. For this reason, it will serve as one of our core measures in our estimations
below.
As q̂T is only available from November 2002, we repeat the factor analysis on just q̂R
and q̂M from 1997 in order to construct a longer series of beliefs. We again find a single
common factor according to the Kaiser criterion, which we use to construct a measure of
public beliefs q̂RM by applying the Φ reverse transformation as above. Over the period
22Since Φ−1 (0) = −∞ and Φ−1 (1) = ∞ we replace 0 values in the raw measures with 0.001 and 1
values with 0.999.
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in which we can construct both q̂RMT and q̂RM they have a correlation of 0.94 (which is
statistically significantly different from zero at 99% level).23
Table 3 below provides descriptive statistics for all five beliefs measures this section
has presented; figure 5 shows these as time series (as one can see from 5b q̂RMT and q̂RM
are very similar); and figure 6 plots the histograms for each belief measure derived from
the common factor analysis.
Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Reuters q (q̂R) 0.5 0.3 0 1 137
Times q (q̂T ) 0.4 0.4 0 1 77
Market q (q̂M) 0.6 0.1 0.2 1 138
Extracted Belief RMT (q̂RMT ) 0.5 0.3 0.1 1 75
Extracted Belief RM (q̂RM) 0.5 0.2 0.1 1 137
(a) Proxies for the Prior qt
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Figure 5: Key Empirical Variables
4.4.1 Is the transformed principal common factor a belief?
We have so far extracted a single common factor that drives most of the variation in the
three raw measures of public beliefs. This fact alone says nothing about whether this
23One concern may be that none of the measures captures the information that arises in discussions
during the MPC meeting prior to the point at which they vote. This information becomes public to the
MPC members and should be included in the theoretically relevant measure of the common prior. To
attempt to address this, we have also created a common factor using the three variables above as well
as the actual votes of the MPC members in the meeting. This exercise shows again that there is only
a single common factor among the 4 variables. Moreover, this common factor is highly correlated with
“Common factor 1” which is constructed without using the information from the discussion (correlation
is 0.87 and statistically significantly different from zero at 99% level). We do not present, or use, this
measure here but it is available from the us on request.
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Figure 6: Histogram of the Extracted Beliefs
common factor, or more precisely its transformation into q̂RMT (and q̂RM in the longer
series), is actually picking up public beliefs or instead some other common component.
While we cannot directly observe whether q̂RMT and q̂RM are measuring qt we can at least
say whether they are correlated with individual votes in a way that our model predicts
qt should be.
A preliminary test of the consistency of q̂RMT and q̂RM is whether they predict whether
or not an individual votes for the high rate. According to our model, a higher qt should
mean a greater probability of voting high, regardless of the values of θ and σ. To check
this, we estimate the model
v̂it = α + ψ1 · q̂xt (7)
for x ∈ {RMT,RM} via panel logit both with and without individual fixed effects. As
table 4 shows, both q̂RMT and q̂RM are statistically significant predictors of whether or
not an individual votes high.
A more subtle property of qt in the model relates to individual disagreement. As qt
tends to 0 (1) in the model, it is easy to see that the probability that all members vote
for the low (high) rate tends to one. In other words, when the public prior contains very
strong evidence that one or the other inflationary shock has hit the economy, no member
should dissent from the majority. On the other hand, for intermediate values of qt, there
is less certainty in the public prior so dissent is more likely than when qt takes on extreme
values. Empirically, if q̂RMT and q̂RM are indeed valid measures of qt, we would expect
them to have a concave relationship with whether or not a member deviates from the
majority. To check this we estimate the model
D (Deviates from MPCit) = α + ψ1 · q̂xt + ψ2 · (q̂xt )2 + εit (8)
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Table 4: Checks on the Behavior of the Extracted Beliefs:
Estimates of Equation (7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
v̂it v̂it v̂it v̂it
q̂RMT 6.35*** 8.58***
(0.00) (0.00)
q̂RM 6.74*** 8.56***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -3.04*** -4.14*** -3.27*** -4.85***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 667 659 1,201 1,198
Estimation Panel Logit Panel Logit Panel Logit Panel Logit
Member effects None FE None FE
p-value in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Checks on the Behavior of the Extracted Beliefs:
Estimates of Equation (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Deviate) D(Deviate) D(Deviate) D(Deviate)
q̂RMT 6.25*** 6.99***
(0.00) (0.00)
(q̂RMT )2 -6.09*** -6.98***
(0.00) (0.00)
q̂RM 3.16* 3.30*
(0.07) (0.08)
(q̂RM)2 -3.40** -3.29*
(0.05) (0.07)
Constant -3.09*** 0.57 -2.40*** -1.90***
(0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 667 617 1,201 1,087
Estimation Panel Logit Panel Logit Panel Logit Panel Logit
Member effects None FE None FE
p-value in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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for x ∈ {RMT,RM}, where D (Deviates from MPCit) is a dummy variable equal 1 if
member i deviates from the majority in time t, again via panel logit. As table 5 shows,
both the linear and quadratic terms in q̂xt are highly significant and consistent with
concavity.
5 Testing the Model
A key prediction of our model is that signal differences between external and internal
members should manifest themselves as different tendencies to vote for high interest
rates depending on the value of the public prior. This section first examines whether
external and internal members have a different relative tendency to vote high depending
on the value of public beliefs, and find this is case. To determine whether this arises from
differences in σ or θ parameters we move beyond reduced form analysis, structurally esti-
mate the parameters in internals’ and externals’ decision rules, and find strong evidence
of signal differences.
5.1 Reduced-form evidence
Before examining how voting behavior depends on the prior, we first simply see how in-
ternal and externals differ without conditioning on public information. When we observe
v̂it = 1 we say that a member has chosen the “high” vote and when we observe v̂it = 0
we say that a member has chosen the “low” vote. Figure 7 displays the percentage of
internal and external votes that are high and low. It clearly shows that internal members
vote for high rates more frequently. Differences of proportion tests, reported below the
figure, show that the 12.7 gap in the percentage of high votes for internal members is
statistically significant at 99.9% level. This appears to confirm the idea in the existing
literature that there are strong philosophical differences between internal and external
members, with external members sytematically favoring lower interest rates.
The first step in our empirical analysis is to examine voting differences conditional on
public information to see if any strong patterns emerge from the data. To do so, we now
split the sample periods into two using both q̂RMT and q̂RM . “Low-q” periods are those
in which the proxy for qt is below 0.5 and “high-q” those in which it is above. Figure
8 replicates figure 7 with this stratification, clearly showing that conditioning on public
information modifies the unconditional results. In particular, there is no statistical differ-
ence between the voting of internal and external members in low-q periods (differences of
proportions tests are provided below the figures); it is only in high-q periods that internal
members are more likely to vote for the high interest rate.
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Another way to look at this issue is to run a simple analysis of the probability that
internal and external members vote for the higher interest rate for different values of q̂RM .
In table 6 we estimate:
D(v̂it = 1) = α + γ1 ·D(External = 1) (9)
where the sample is split into four quartiles based on the value of q̂RM . Again, we find
that the majority of the conflict arises in the upper two quartiles, with external members
actually slightly more likely to vote for high rates than internal in the lowest quartile. The
rest of the paper attempts to explain why the patterns in figure 8 and table 6 emerge.
More precisely, if we attribute to all external members parameters θE and σE and all
internal members parameters θI and σI , we are interested in what combination of these
four parameters best explains the data.
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Table 6: The likelihood of voting for the high rate by type across the quartiles of q̂RMt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
D(External) 0.22 -0.29* -0.77*** -0.56***
(0.199) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.11*** -0.18* 0.75*** 1.07***
(0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000)
Internal Prob .13 .43 .77 .86
External Prob .19 .32 .49 .69
Estimation Probit Probit Probit Probit
Range of q̂RMt ≤ .342 > .342 & ≤ .488 > .488 & ≤ .703 > .703
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
It is first instructive to ask how philosophy differences alone might account for these
findings. One might imagine that θE is small so that external members essentially always
vote for low rates while internal members have less extreme preferences and vote for low
rates when qt is low and high rates when qt is high. The awkwardness of explanations that
rely solely on θ differences is that the voting behavior of internal and external members
in terms of high votes is, on average, nearly exactly the same when qt proxies are less than
0.5. While extreme dovishness among externals may generate an increased divergence
between internals and externals in terms of the frequency of voting high as qt increases,
such a story would presumably show at least some conflict on average when qt proxies
are low.
Of course σ differences might also underlie the voting patterns. Suppose that in ad-
dition to an underlying philosophical difference (θE < θI) there were also an information
difference σE < σI . Recalling proposition 2, such an informational difference would make,
ceteris paribus, external members more likely to vote for high rates than internal mem-
bers for low qt and less likely to vote for high rates for high qt. In other words, externals’
lower σ would counteract the philosophical difference for low qt and reinforce it for high
qt. This provides an alternative explanation to one that relies on philosophical differences
alone.
Without moving away from reduced form analysis it is difficult to go beyond the
above informal discussion of the effects of different parameter combinations. As such
we now move towards structural estimation, which allows us to directly estimate which
parameters best fit the data.
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5.2 Structural evidence
Our model generates the likelihood function Lit over policy choices in time t as
Lit =
qt
(
1− Φ
(
s∗it−1
σi
))
+ (1− qt)
(
1− Φ
(
s∗it
σi
))
if vit = 1
qtΦ
(
s∗it−1
σi
)
+ (1− qt)Φ
(
s∗it
σi
)
if vit = 0.
(10)
With our proxies v̂it, q̂
RMT , and q̂RM we can simply directly estimate the model via
maximum likelihood after resolving two estimation difficulties.24
First, for reasons we explain below, we cannot estimate θ and σ parameters for each
member separately. Instead we model θi = αθ + βθD(EXT)i and σi = ασ + βσD(EXT)i
where D(EXT)i is a dummy variable equal one if member i is external. In other words,
we assume that voting parameters are constant within the subgroups of internal and
external voters and compare across these groups. While one might worry about the effect
of individual heterogeneity, we show in section 6 via a Monte Carlo exercise that assuming
within-group homogeneity in the presence of within-group heterogeneity does not bias the
estimates of the group mean.
The second difficulty in implementing the estimator is that the likelihood function
is nearly flat for large and small values of qt when σ is large. When σ increases, the
probability of voting for the high rate as a function of qt approaches a step function as
figure 9 shows. This implies that our maximum likelihood estimator will have difficulty
converging when qt takes on extreme values. Therefore in our estimation procedures we
drop periods in which q̂RMT , or alternatively q̂RM , lies below 0.15 or above 0.85; with
q̂RMT we lose 24 out of 75 periods and under q̂RM we lose 20 out of 137 periods.25
Our first estimation uses q̂RM instead of q̂RMT since the former covers more time
periods. The results of the estimation, using heteroskedastic-robust estimates of the
variance covariance matrix, are shown in table 7. We report heterogeneity in θ and
σ between external and internal members both in terms of gaps and ratios. The key
result is that highly significant differences exist along both the θ and σ dimensions.
External members’ θ parameter is 0.41 as opposed to 0.55 for internals; the gap is highly
significantly different from 0 and their ratio is highly significantly different from 1. This
result is of independent interest since the hawk-dove distinction between internals and
externals is robust to controlling for σ differences.
24Our estimation is done in Stata and the programs are available on request. In order to facilitate
faster estimation, we actually estimate ln(σi) and ln
(
θi
1−θi
)
and then convert our estimates and standard
errors back appropriately.
25The presence of many unanimous decision in the Times MPC pushes the common factor underlying
q̂RMT into the extremes more often than q̂RM , so even though they have the same mean the variance of
the former is larger, meaning that we drop more time periods in percentage terms when we use it.
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Figure 9: The Probability of Voting for the High Interest Rate
The result more central to our paper is on σ differences. The external σ parameter
is almost half that of the internal σ with again a highly significant gap and ratio. This
implies that externals and internals differ not just in terms of philosophy but also in
terms of how influential the public prior is in their decision making; in short, external
members are systematically more likely to contradict public beliefs than internal mem-
bers. While our structural results alone do not identify the precise mechanism driving
this different propensity to deviate from conventional wisdom, it does show that it is an
important factor influencing observed voting behavior. One interpretation that readers
might be tempted to make is that we have found more underlying variation in externals’
θ parameters than in internals’. In fact, this issue is wholly orthogonal to the σ dimen-
sion, which instead measures differences in posterior belief formation, not heterogeneity
in philosophies. In fact, section 6.1 shows that not controlling for additional variation on
the θ dimension for external members does not bias the estimated σ difference.
Figure 10 is the estimated counterpart to figure 3; it is the predicted probability that
internal and external members will vote for a high rate given the estimated values of the
voting parameters. As can be seen, external members are on average less likely to vote
for high rates, but this tendency is more pronounced as qt increases. Comfortingly, this
matches the reduced form results from above. In fact, the predicted probability differences
from the structural estimates qualitatively track quite closely the actual reduced form
probability differences presented in table 6 for alternative ranges of the prior. In the first
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Table 7: Estimates of θ and σ using Extracted Belief RM (q̂RM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES external=0 external=1 Difference Ratio
theta 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.14*** 1.34***
[0.53 - 0.58] [0.34 - 0.48] (0.000) (0.001)
sigma 1.39*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 2.07***
[1.13 - 1.64] [0.42 - 0.92] (0.000) (0.001)
Robust 95% confidence interval in brackets
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1)-(3), H0: Estimate = 0
Column (4) H0: Ratio = 1
quartile, external members are predicted to vote slightly more often for high rates than
internals; in the second quartile this small tendency is reversed; in the third the predicted
probability gap is quite large; and in the fourth it is again large but smaller than in the
third. This is corresponds exactly to the pattern in table 6. Crucially, our structural
estimates indicate that this emerges because external members tend to contradict the
prior, not simply because they have dovish preferences.
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Figure 10: The Estimated Probability of Voting for the High Interest Rate
We can also run the same regressions on the restricted sample using q̂RMT ; the results
are contained in table 8. The major difference between these results and those in table 7
is that the estimated magnitudes of the σ parameters are smaller. In fact, using q̂RMT , all
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members are measured to be less influenced by public beliefs on average. This is because
q̂RMT has a slightly different shape to q̂RM for reasons alluded to in footnote 25 above.
The important message for our paper, however, is not to establish the exact magnitude
of the parameters, but rather how they differ across different voters. In this sense, very
little changes from the previous estimations: the ratios of θ and σ parameters is nearly
the same as in table 7. One more point to note is that here all estimates are measured
with more noise due to the smaller sample size, meaning the statistical significance of the
results drops slightly. Now we find differences in both dimension are significant at the
10% level and the estimated ratios at the 15% level.
Table 8: Estimates of θ and σ using Extracted Belief RMT (q̂RMT )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES external=0 external=1 Difference Ratio
theta 0.61*** 0.43*** 0.18* 1.41
[0.55 - 0.66] [0.24 - 0.62] (0.078) (0.131)
sigma 0.90*** 0.48** 0.42* 1.89
[0.62 - 1.18] [0.11 - 0.84] (0.072) (0.131)
Robust 95% confidence interval in brackets
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1)-(3), H0: Estimate = 0
Column (4) H0: Ratio = 1
The ultimate message of this paper is that the σ dimension is important for explaining
the MPC voting record. Perhaps the most direct test of this hypothesis is to see whether
allowing for σ variation improves the model’s fit. The first two columns of table 9 show
the results from two different MLE regressions. The first is simply a replication of the
regression from above using q̂RM . Now, a key question is: would the model explain
less of the variation in the data if σ were constrained to be constant across internals
and externals? Accordingly, the second regression in table 9 performs this constrained
regression. Answering the previous question is equivalent to performing a likelihood ratio
test; the hypothesis that the restriction of no σ heterogeneity is valid can be rejected
with a p-value less than 0.001. This analysis can be replicated on the restricted sample
with q̂RMT (the third and fourth columns of the table) and again the hypothesis no σ
heterogeneity can be rejected, albeit at the smaller p-value of 0.034 due to the smaller
sample size. These results highlight in a clear way that philosophy differences alone
cannot account for the data as well as the combination of philosophical differences and
σ differences.
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Table 9: The effect of not allowing for differences in the σ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unrestricted Just θ Unrestricted Just θ
θI 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.61*** 0.64***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
θE 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.46***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σI 1.39*** 1.01*** 0.90*** 0.71***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σE 0.67*** 1.01*** 0.48*** 0.71***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
Theta Ratio 1.34 1.28 1.41 1.38
Theta Ratio p-value& [0.004] [0.000] [0.193] [.017]
Sigma Ratio 2.07 1 1.89 1
Sigma Ratio p-value& [0.008] . [0.243] .
Log-Likelihood -543.96 -554.23 -259.94 -262.18
LR test . 20.55 . 4.47
Prob > chi2 . 0.000 . .034
Proxy q̂RM q̂RM q̂RMT q̂RMT
Trimmed [0.15− 0.85] [0.15− 0.85] [0.15− 0.85] [0.15− 0.85]
p-value in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
& null hypothesis is difference from 1
5.3 Effect of mis-specifying σ
The final estimation exercise that we conduct is to examine how the measured gap in
θ changes as one imposes different values of σ onto the model. The motivation for this
is to examine whether explicitly estimating the σ parameter is important for correctly
identifying differences in preferences. Even if one were interested in correctly computing
the degree of preference conflict between two experts and not interested in their informa-
tion differences, it might still be important to account for the latter in order to correctly
estimate the former.
In order to examine this question, we estimate three different versions of our model
with the proxy q̂RM : one in which σ = 0.4 for both groups; one in which σ = 1 for both
groups; and one in which σ = 5 for both groups. The pattern that emerges from the
results, displayed in table 10, is that the estimated θ difference is decreasing in value of
σ imposed on the model. The regression with σ = 1 (which corresponds to the estimated
value of σ in table 9) estimates a θ gap of 0.13. When σ is set to 0.4 the estimated
difference grows more than five times to 0.77, and when σ is set to 5 it is nearly cut in
half to 0.067. Thus the estimated θ difference appears sensitive to mis-specification of
σ, especially for small values. Hence empirical exercises that seek to measure preference
differences in contexts where learning about the state of the world from private signals is
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relevant, the estimation of those signals’ distribution is crucial.
Table 10: The effect of estimating θ using different assumptions for σ
(a) σ = 0.4, θ Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(External)=0 D(External)=1 Difference Ratio
θ 0.90*** 0.13** 0.77*** 6.99***
[0.83 - 0.98] [0.00088 - 0.26] (0.000) (0.000)
(b) σ = 1, θ Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(External)=0 D(External)=1 Difference Ratio
θ 0.57*** 0.44*** 0.13*** 1.28***
[0.54 - 0.60] [0.41 - 0.48] (0.000) (0.000)
(c) σ = 5, θ Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(External)=0 D(External)=1 Difference Ratio
θ 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.067*** 1.14***
[0.52 - 0.56] [0.45 - 0.50] (0.000) (0.000)
Robust 95% confidence interval in brackets
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1)-(3), H0: Estimate = 0
Column (3) H0: Ratio = 1
6 Robustness
To conclude our empirical analysis we return to two important issues mentioned in the
text above. First we explore the consequences for our results if we allow for individual
heterogeneity. Next we go deeper into the problems associated with two of our three
raw measures of public beliefs reflecting predictions of MPC voting outcomes rather than
predictions of the underlying inflationary conditions. Neither concern appears to have a
substantial impact on our key findings.
6.1 Individual heterogeneity
In our analysis, we have not included member fixed effects for two main reasons. The
first is that, as we make use of a probit-type estimation, inclusion of fixed-effects is
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potentially problematic (Baltagi 2005). Second, we are interested in the behavior of
the average external and internal member on the MPC and not heterogeneity among
individual members. While we accept that the θ and σ parameters may differ at the level
of individual members, member fixed effects would soak up the variation in which we
are interested. We would therefore need to calculate member-specific estimates and then
examine the distribution of these member-specific parameters by internal and external
grouping. The problem with this approach is that many external members have not
served for long periods, and our likelihood estimator is unable to converge in many cases.
The approach we pursue above means that we can draw on statistical power from the
fact that we have over 500 external member votes and over 600 internal member votes.
Nevertheless, one may still be concerned that individual heterogeneity manifests itself
in the form of biased estimates when we impose the restriction of a common θ and σ
within the group of internals and externals. In order to address these worries, we carry
out two robustness exercises. First, we confirm that our analysis is unchanged if we relax
the assumption that each of our observations is conditionally uncorrelated. While the
previous results used heteroskedastic-robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix,
these estimates do not allow for member-specific correlation of errors. In table 11, we use
the q̂RM prior but instead cluster the errors by individual member; there is no change in
the significance of the σ differences, and the significance of the θ ratio only falls to 11%.
Table 11: Robustness to Individual Heterogeneity: Estimates if cluster errors by member
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal External Difference Ratio
θ 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.14* 1.34
[0.52 - 0.59] [0.27 - 0.56] (0.060) (0.101)
σ 1.39*** 0.67*** 0.72*** 2.07***
[1.23 - 1.55] [0.31 - 1.03] (0.000) (0.009)
Errors Clustered by Member
95% confidence interval in brackets
p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1)-(3), H0: Estimate = 0
Column (4) H0: Ratio = 1
Second, we use Monte Carlo simulations to study the properties of our estimator
when there is individual heterogeneity in both θ and σ parameters. The full details are
contained in appendix C, and here we simply present the main findings. We first perform
the same exercise as in section 5 and allow for across group differences but no within
group differences; this is simply to verify that if the data exactly matched our modelling
assumptions, our estimator would produce unbiased results, and indeed the simulations
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indicate this is the case.
Next we allow for each individual’s θ and σ parameter to be drawn from a uniform
distribution, and assume that internals’ and externals’ distributions differ in means but
not in variances. We then impose within group homogeneity on the estimator and examine
whether it accurately estimates the group average. Since our regression model is non-
linear it is perhaps not clear ex ante that this will be true, but the Monte Carlo results
nevertheless indicate that it is.
Our last exercise is designed to address a particular concern. Suppose that external
members not only have a lower average θ but that the distribution from which their θ
parameters are drawn has a higher variance than the one for internal members. If we fail
to control for the additional variance in the external θ distribution, will it wrongly show
up as a difference in σ parameters? More loosely speaking, is the only difference that our
empirical results on σ capture the fact that external members have more heterogeneous
philosophies? To answer this question, we perform another set of simulations in which
we again assume that individual parameters are drawn from a uniform distribution, but
that the external θ distribution is more variable than the internal. We again find that
if we impose within group homogeneity on our estimator it accurately estimates group
averages of θ and σ.
Note that these results also indicate that the imposition of time-independence of the
θ and σ parameters is also innocuous. Any dynamics in these parameters would appear
in exactly the same way that individual variation does in the Monte Carlo exercises. If σ
and θ change through time, our estimator still appears to uncover the average difference
between internals and externals.
6.2 The prior as a measure of voting outcomes
We now revisit the issue of the potential prediction bias in the Reuters survey. Consider
an outside observer to the committee that holds the public prior qt that the economy is
in the high inflation state. In order to predict the outcome the committee will actually
decide, a natural tendency would be to predict the vote of the average internal member,
since there are more internals than externals. Figure 11 plots out the probability than an
internal member votes high on the basis of the parameter values estimated in our baseline
results (the red curve) against the 45 degree line. If the outside observer reported his
prior belief directly, one could read his report from the 45 degree line. On the other
hand, if he were reporting the predicted decision, one would read his report off of the red
line. For example, suppose that qt = 0.3. At this value of the prior, the internal member
votes high with probability 0.17, meaning that if the observer were reporting predictions
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of outcomes rather than predictions of inflation shocks, there would be a downward bias
of 0.12. On the other hand, if qt = 0.7, the red line gives a value of 0.93, introducing
an upward bias of 0.23. In other words, the prediction bias, if it exists, biases reported
beliefs down when qt is low and up when qt is high.
26 This would be true if the outside
observer predicted the outcome using the characteristics of the average member, or even
the average external member.
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Figure 11: How qt is related to q̂t when the respondent is predicting the outcome
The first important point that emerges from figure 11 is that the predicted probability
that an internal member votes for the high rate is increasing in the prior probability
that the high inflation state is realized—there is a one-to-one mapping between the two
quantities. So ordering periods according to reported beliefs based on predicted outcomes
produces the same ordering of periods that unbiased reports would. So the reduced form
results above, even if based on biased belief data, will still be valid in a qualitative sense.
More importantly, we don’t use the raw data series in our structural estimation but
rather use our extracted beliefs based on common factor analysis. We have already argued
that the single common factor that explains the covariation in our three raw measures
should reflect the underlying common prior that goes into forming each of them. As such,
any prediction bias in the Reuters should not arise in it.
One way of identifying whether this is the case is seeing whether q̂RM and q̂RMT correct
q̂R in a way consistent with the cleaning of the anticipated prediction error. To examine
this in a simple way, consider figure 12a, which is a scatter plot of q̂RM on the horizontal
26Of course, one may also think that the prediction curve shifts over the sample period; for example,
if the committee composition changes then the optimal prediction may require a different imputed value
of θ and σ to the average external member. Recall, however, that we found absolutely no evidence of
such variability in the common factor analysis.
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axis against the corresponding values of q̂R on the vertical. The vertical line corresponds
to the point at which the red curve in figure 11 crosses the blue, or 0.45. The relationship
between the two is broadly consistent with q̂RM being the average underlying belief on qt
and q̂R being the predicted committee decision made on the basis of it. Below 0.45, the
majority of the observations of q̂R lie below the 45 degree line, whereas above 0.45 the
majority lie above it, just as the model would predict. Figure 12b replicates this analysis
on the basis of q̂RMT (now placing a vertical line at 0.37, which is where the prediction
bias is estimated to change signs on the basis of the parameter estimates in table 8) and
again finds broadly the same pattern.
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Figure 12: Scatter of raw Reuters (qR) and Extracted Beliefs (q̂RM and q̂RMT )
In order to more explicitly examine prediction bias, we also carried out our own
(one-off) survey of market participants replicating the approach of Reuters by asking re-
spondents to write down probability mass functions over different interest rate outcomes,
but unlike Reuters we ask two questions. The first explicitly asks what the respondent
thinks the MPC will do (which we call qwill) and the second asks what they believe should
happen (qshould). We carried out the survey in the week of the April 2011 meeting and
received 26 responses including from some of the most prominent market economists in
the City of London; 14 of these are monthly respondents of the Reuters survey. Nearly all
the probability was placed on no change and +25bps, which were the two votes observed
in the subsequent meeting.
We find that the average qwill is 0.16 while the average qshould is 0.26, which is consistent
with their being a prediction bias.27 In order to see how our common factor analysis would
27Interestingly, among the subset of respondents that regularly appear in our Reuters survey, there is
a negligible difference between the average responses to the two questions - the average qwill is 0.18 while
the average qshould is 0.21. Thus, while there is no doubt that respondents are being asked to predict
outcomes, how they go about doing so may not actually correspond to the rather complex process
described above, but to simply reporting one’s genuine belief.
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treat this situation, we:
1. treat qwill as the q̂R (Reuter’s response) for April 2011;
2. plug in the April 2011 values for q̂M and q̂T as described above;
3. perform our common factor analysis as in section 4 and generate q̂RMT .
We find that q̂RMT for April 2011 is 0.25, which is much closer to the average qshould
than the average qwill. Thus, in the presence of a discrepancy between the two responses,
our factor analysis approach appears to deliver a result more or less in line with respon-
dents’ beliefs independent of prediction bias. Whilst only a one-off survey, this exercise
reassures us that using multiple sources on the public prior helps to correct for any
prediction bias which may be present in the Reuters survey.
7 Conclusion
This paper has both demonstrated that philosophy and signal differences are separately
identifiable from policy choices and applied our model to MPC voting data to show that
each contributes to fitting the data. Our findings complement the existing literature on
MPC voting that emphasizes preference conflict between internal and external members
by estimating that the latter have more dovish philosophies, but also extends it by esti-
mating that externals’ policy choices are on average less influenced by public beliefs than
internals’. More generally, we have provided a clean way of estimating the parameters
of Bayesian decision rules that are common in the theory literature, meaning that one
could use our same approach in contexts other than monetary policy.
While we have taken care to highlight that internal and external members have dif-
ferent estimated signal distributions, we have not provided a precise interpretation of the
result. In the spirit of discussion, we can offer a few ideas on what might drive it, but
leave the task of discriminating among them to future research. In our model members
begin with a public forecast of a shock and then combine it with their private forecast to
form their posterior beliefs. The most literal interpretation of the result is that external
members put more weight on their private forecast than internal members because their
private forecasts provide relatively more insight on economic conditions. Note that this
statement is not necessarily equivalent to saying that external members have more ex-
pertise than internals. It could be, for example, that internals’ forecasts are incorporated
into the market’s belief more so than externals’ if the Bank’s public communications
reflect more the former. Still, several other factors might drive the result.
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First, our model implicitly assumes that members’ signals are independent conditional
on the prior but in practice this may not be the case. Our constructed prior is an
aggregation of individual views that might be more correlated with internal members’
than externals’. Informally speaking, the market and internals might “see the world” in
the same way while externals exhibit more unique outlooks. Second, internal and external
members might have utilities from contradicting the prior apart from those modeled. For
example, internals members might fear contradicting the market’s expectations more than
external members, or external members might want to appear contrarian to increase their
exposure or gain a reputation as experts.28
Whichever combination of these forces explains our results, we hope to have convinced
the reader that an aspect of decision making that is often ignored in the empirical liter-
ature is in fact of first order importance. We view this as an important first step in the
effort to tackle the difficult twin questions of why experts choose the policies that they
do and how committees should be optimally composed.
28The possibility that career concerns lead members to react to the prior distribution to gain reputation
has been emphasized by, among others, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2000), Levy (2004), Levy (2007), Visser
and Swank (2007), and Meade and Stasavage (2008).
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A Model Derivations and Micro-foundations
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. As is clear from equation (3) in the text, ŵ(sit) is strictly increasing in sit.
So the voter adopts a cutoff rule by choosing vit = 1 if and only if sit ≥ s∗it where
ŵ (s∗it) = 1 − θi. This in turn is equivalent to ln
(
ŵ(s∗it)
1−ŵ(s∗it)
)
= ln
(
1−θi
θi
)
. Plugging in
equation (3) immediately gives the result.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. The probability of member i voting for a high rate, given in (10), can be alter-
natively expressed as
q
{
1− Φ
[
− 1
2σ
− σ ln
(
q
1− q
θ
1− θ
)]}
+ (1− q)
{
1− Φ
[
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2σ
− σ ln
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q
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θ
1− θ
)]}
whose derivative with respect to σ is
− qφ
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using the fact that by definition
φ
[
s∗
σ
]
=
q
1− q
θ
1− θφ
[
s∗ − 1
σ
]
allows this to be rewritten as
−qφ
[
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σ
] [
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which simplifies to
−qφ
[
s∗ − 1
σ
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1
1− θ
[
1− 2θ
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− ln
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)
.
]
so the derivative is positive if and only if
ln
(
q
1− q
θ
1− θ
)
>
1− 2θ
4σ2
38
which is clearly satisfied for all q > q∗ ∈ (0, 1) since ln
(
q
1−q
)
is monotonically increasing
from −∞ to ∞ as q ranges from 0 to 1.
A.3 New Keynesian Model of Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999)
This section presents a basic version of Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler’s (1999) New-Keynesian
model of monetary policy as presented in Gal´ı (2008). We show that such a model leads
to a similar interest rate rule as we derived in section 3. To begin with, we define the
welfare-relevant output gap is xt ≡ yt−yet , where yt is the log of the stochastic component
of output and yet is (log) efficient level of output, and the natural level of output y
N
t to be
the flexible price and wage level of output. Finally, define pit as the deviation of period t
inflation from its long-run level and it to be the nominal interest rate.
As is standard in the New Keynesian model, the economy is characterized by a dy-
namic IS curve and a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC):
xt =Et[xt+1 ]− φ(it −Et[ pit+1 ]− ret ) (A.1)
pit =βEt[ pit+1 ] + κxt + ut (A.2)
Equation (A.1) is derived from a log-linearisation of the household Euler equation
where ret = −logβ + 1φEt
[
∆yet+1
]
is the interest rate that supports the efficient level
of output and φ is inversely related to the curvature of the consumption function. For
simplicity we allow only for a shock to the NKPC, ut; this shock is generally called a
cost-push shock in the literature but it can be anything which drives a wedge between yet
and yNt such as changes in desired mark-ups, or anything that affects expected marginal
costs.29 This shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) stochastic process:
ut =ρuut−1 + st (A.3)
The social loss to the representative household are approximated (using a second-
order approximation) to be proportional to a function that is quadratic in inflation and
output where λ is κ
ε
(and ε is the substitutability between goods in the consumption
aggregator):30
Γt =
pi2t
2
+ λ
y2t
2
(A.4)
29We can also include a shock to the IS curve, gt, which is related to expectations of the relative changes
in natural output and government spending. Such a shock enters the optimal interest rate linearly.
30We can also allow for an interest rate smoothing term.
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We assume that the policymaker has discretion to choose the interest rate at time t,
based on information available at the end of time t− 1, so as to minimize the discounted
future losses. As the central banker is free to reoptimise in every period, there is no way
that they can credibly commit to any pre-specified path of future policy; this allows us to
reduce the problem to a series of static problems in which the central bank takes private
sector expectations as given. The discretionary problem to determine optimal monetary
policy is:
minimize
it
pi2t
2
+ λ
y2t
2
+Et

∞∑
τ=1
Γt+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
taken as given

subject to pit = κxt + βEt[ pit+1 ] + ut︸ ︷︷ ︸
ft taken as given
The first order necessary condition for an optimum is:
xt =− κ
λ
pit (A.5)
We can use equation (A.5), together with the other model equations, to derive the
optimal interest rate:
it =r
e
t +
1
φ
(
1
κ2 + λ(1− βρu)
)
(κ+ λφ)ut +
1
φ
gt (A.6)
Forcing the MPC member must choose between two interest rates it > it (as we do in
our main model and show is the case for most MPC meetings), the vote is given by:
vit =
it if ijt ≥ it − 12.5bpsit otherwise (A.7)
where ijt =r
e
jt +
1
φ
(
1
κ2 + λ(1− βρu)
)
(κ+ λφ)ut
Of course, this assumes that the central banker has perfect knowledge of the current
period information whereas we are interested in the vote under imperfect information.
As Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler’s (1999) Result 9 states: “With imperfect information,
stemming either from data problems or lags in the effect of policy, the optimal policy
rules are the certainty equivalent versions of the perfect information case. Policy rules
must be expressed in terms of the forecasts of target variables as opposed to the ex post
behavior.” Therefore, under uncertainty about the state of the economy, where Ωt is the
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information set at time t, the decision rule is as above except that we have:
rejt +
1
φ
(
1
κ2 + λ(1− βρu)
)
(κ+ λφ)E[ut | Ωt ] ≥ it − 12.5bps (A.8)
In other words, the member will vote for the higher interest rate (it) if and only if:
E[ut | Ωt ] ≥ φ
(
κ2 + λ(1− βρu)
(κ+ λφ)
)[
it − rejt − 12.5bps
]
(A.9)
This is analogous to equation (2) in our main model; the member votes high when
their belief about the economic shock exceeds their member-specific cut-off.
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B Data
B.1 Reuter’s Survey Data
As described above, the Reuters Data that we have been able to gather is divided into
three segments corresponding to data availability, and each period calls for a different
construction methodology. Implicit in the construction is how we define D̂(High Vote)it.
June 1997 - June 1998: Mark I Construction
We have modal data, all of which takes a value of 0, and +25, except for October 1997
in which one bank reported +50 which we treat as +25.
• q̂Rt is computed as the total number of reports for +25 over the total number of
reports.
• Anomalies
– In the May 1998 MPC meeting there were 6 votes for no change, 1 vote for
-25 (Julius) and 1 vote for +25 (Buiter). We treat the -25 vote as a low vote
and proceed as above.
– In the June 1998 MPC meeting there were 8 votes for +25 and 1 vote for -25
(Julius). Again, we treat -25 as a low vote.
July 1998 - December 2001: Mark II Construction
We have partial probability distribution data over rise, no change, and cut. In some
periods only two of these three options are available.
• We compute the average probability placed on rise, cut, and no change.
• For all periods in which the observe votes that lie in the set -25,0,25 we treat the
data as if the probability of rise is the probability of +25 and the probability of cut
is the probability of -25.
• For periods in which the votes are +25 and 0 we construct q̂Rt as the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0.
• For periods in which the votes are 0 and -25 we construct q̂Rt as the total average
probability put on 0 over the total average probability placed on 0 and -25.
• For periods in which all votes are for +25 we construct q̂Rt over the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0.
• For periods in which all votes are for -25 we construct q̂Rt over the total average
probability put on 0 over the total average probability placed on 0 and -25.
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• For periods in which all votes are for nochange we construct q̂Rt as the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0 if the
total average probability placed on +25 is larger than the total average probability
placed on -25, and construct q̂Rt as the total average probability put on 0 over the
total average probability placed on 0 and -25 if the total average probability placed
on -25 is larger than the total average probability placed on +25.
• Anomalies
– In August 1998 there were 7 votes for no change, 1 vote for -25 (Julius) and 1
vote for 25 (Buiter). The total average probability placed on +25 is 0.39 and
the total average probability placed on -25 is 0.001. So we treat +25 as high
vote and compute as the total average probability place on +25.
– In January 1999 there was one vote for no change (Plenderleith), 7 votes for
-25, and one vote for -50 (Julius). We treat the vote for -25 and -50 as low
votes and compute q̂Rt as the total average probability placed on nochange over
the total average probability placed on nochange and cut.
– In March 1999 8 people voted for nochange and 1 person (Buiter) voted for
-40. We treat the -40 vote as a vote for -25 and proceed as above.
– In April 2000 3 people voted for +25 and six for 0, but Reuters survey does
not ask for probability of rise. We treat these data as missing in this period.
– In January 2000 the votes were over +25 and +50 and we set q̂Rt = 0.5.
– In April 2001, May 2001, October 2001, and November 2001, the votes were
over -25 and -50 and we set q̂Rt = 0.5.
January 2002 - November 2008: Mark III Construction
We have full distribution data over +50, +25, 0, -25, -50.
• We compute the average probability placed on +50, +25, no change, -25 and -50.
• For periods in which there are two unique votes we take q̂Rt as the total average
probability placed on the higher of the two votes over the total average probability
placed on both votes.
• For periods in which all votes are for +50 we construct q̂Rt over the total average
probability put on +50 over the total average probability placed on +50 and +25.
• For periods in which all votes are for -50 we construct q̂Rt over the total average
probability put on -25 over the total average probability placed on -25 and -50.
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• For periods in which all votes are for nochange we construct q̂Rt as the total average
probability put on +25 over the total average probability placed on +25 and 0 if the
total average probability placed on +25 is larger than the total average probability
placed on -25, and construct q̂Rt as the total average probability put on 0 over the
total average probability placed on 0 and -25 if the total average probability placed
on -25 is larger than the total average probability placed on +25.
• We follow a similar procedure as the above for periods in which all votes are for
+25 or -25.
• Anomalies
– In May 2006 there were six votes for no change, one vote for +25 (Walton)
and one vote for -25 (Nickell). The market put probability 0.08 on -25 and
probability 0.03 on +25. So we take 0 to be high vote and compute q̂Rt as
(meannochange + meanrise25)/(meancut25 + meannochange + meanrise25).
– In April 2008 there were votes for 0, -25, and -50. We take 0 as a high
vote and -25 and -50 as low votes, and compute the high vote as (mean-
nochange)/(meancut25 + meannochange + meancut50).
– In August 2008 there were votes over -25, 0, +25 but the market placed roughly
equal probability on -25 and +25 so we set q̂Rt as missing.
– In November 2008 there was unanimity on -150, which was not considered by
respondents, and we set q̂Rt as missing.
December 2008 - March 2009: Mark IV Construction
We again have modal data.
• In December 2008 everyone vote to cut -100 and -100 was the lower bound on the
modes. We set -100 as low vote and compute q̂Rt as all modes not equal to -100 over
all modes.
• In January 2009 everyone votes to cut by -50 or -100 and these make up most
modes. We set q̂Rt as the number of -50 modes over all modes equal to -50 or -100.
• In February 2009 everyone votes to cut -50 or -100. We take q̂Rt as the total number
of modes not equal to -100 over the total number of modes.
• In March 2009 everyone votes to cut -50. We set -50 as the high vote and set q̂Rt as
all modes -50 or greater over all modes.
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C Monte Carlo Exercise
In this appendix we describe the Monte Carlo exercise that we carry out to explore the
robustness of our estimation approach to individual heterogeneity in terms of θ and σ.
C.1 Design and Implementation
The first test of our estimator (case 1 below) is to determine its performance when our
model exactly generates the data. In order to do this, we use our model to generate
a dataset with 1350 observations with 11 internal members (serving 80 meetings each)
and 12 external members (serving 50 meetings each), a division that roughly mimics our
sample. We attribute to internal members θInt = 0.55 and σInt = 1.3 and to external
members θExt = 0.4 and σExt = 0.7. To generate the jth vote of individual i, we proceed
as follows:
1. we first draw qij from a U [0.15, 0.85] distribution;
2. we then draw ωij ∈ {0, 1} from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter qij;31
3. we draw sij from a N(ωij, σ
2
i ) distribution
4. vij is determined by the voting rule derived in section 3.
We then run our estimator, with the generated values of qij and vij to estimate σInt,
θInt, σExt, and θExt. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times storing the estimates as well
as the true underlying values which started the procedure with.
In case 2 we generate the dataset exactly as above, except that we draw a θ and
σ parameter for each individual in our sample. For internal (external) members, we
draw θ from a U [0.45, 0.65] (U [0.3, 0.5]) distribution and σ from a U [1.0, 1.6] (U [0.3, 1.0])
distribution. We then run our estimator under the restriction that θ and σ are constant
within the group of internals and externals.
In case 3 we proceed as in case 2 but introduce greater heterogeneity in the range of
values that θ can take for external members. Specifically, we draw θExt from a U [0.2, 0.6]
distribution. In this we interested in whether greater heterogeneity of preferences for the
group of external members is picked up in our estimates of σ.
For each case we are interested in how far away the estimated values of σInt, θInt, σExt,
and θExt are from their true values. In cases 2 and 3 we define σInt =
1
11
∑11
1 σi where i
corresponds to the ith internal members. We apply similar definitions to the other three
31Notice that we draw a new state variable for each vote and thus do not construct a time series
dimension; this should not effect the estimates in any systematic way and simplifies the programming.
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Table C.1: Parameter Values for the Monte Carlo Exercises
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Baseline Member Variation External heterogeneity
Internal External Internal External Internal External
θ 0.55 0.4 0.45-0.65 0.3-0.5 0.45-0.65 0.2-0.6
σ 1.3 0.7 1.0-1.6 0.4-1.0 1.0-1.6 0.4-1.0
q̂t qij qij qij
parameters of interest. For each of the 1,000 replications of each case, we calculate the
following biases:
Bias[σ̂Int] = σ̂Int − σInt
Bias[σ̂Ext] = σ̂Ext − σExt
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] = (σ̂Int − σInt)− (σ̂Ext − σExt)
Bias
[
σ̂Int
σ̂Ext
]
=
σ̂Int
σ̂Ext
− σInt
σExt
Bias[θ̂Int] = θ̂Int − θInt
Bias[θ̂Ext] = θ̂Ext − θExt
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] = (θ̂Int − θInt)− (θ̂Ext − θExt)
Bias
[
θ̂Int
θ̂Ext
]
=
θ̂Int
θ̂Ext
− θInt
θExt
C.2 Results
For each case, we report in Table C.2 the mean bias as well as select points in the
distribution of the biases over the 1,000 replications (we use the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th
and 90th percentiles).
Our basic estimator accurately estimates all the various parameters of interest when
there is no heterogeneity within types (case 1). Introducing individual heterogeneity (case
2), for which our estimator does not account, has a negligible effect on the point estimates
of parameters or the differences and ratios between internal and external members. This
is even the case when we introduce more preference heterogeneity among the external
members (case 3); importantly for our analysis, such greater heterogeneity does lead us
to wrongly identifiy informational differences.
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Table C.2: Results of the Monte Carlo Exercises
Variable Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Case 1
Bias[σ̂Int] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[σ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[ σ̂Int
σ̂Ext
] 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.4
Bias[θ̂Int] 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bias[θ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[ θ̂Int
θ̂Ext
] 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
Case 2
Bias[σ̂Int] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[σ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[ σ̂Int
σ̂Ext
] -0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.4
Bias[θ̂Int] 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bias[θ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[ θ̂Int
θ̂Ext
] 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
Case 3
Bias[σ̂Int] -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Bias[σ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.1
Bias[σ̂Int − σ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[ σ̂Int
σ̂Ext
] -0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4
Bias[θ̂Int] 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bias[θ̂Ext] -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0
Bias[θ̂Int − θ̂Ext] 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Bias[ θ̂Int
θ̂Ext
] 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
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